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Resumo
Com base nas principais contribuições da teoria política normativa sobre justiça global e 
ética da migração, o presente artigo avalia os pactos globais sobre refugiados e migração, 
aprovados pela Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas em dezembro de 2018. O conjunto 
de conclusões indica que os pactos constituem um avanço importante em projetos e 
compromissos morais e políticos globais, porém a operação dos seus termos previstos pode 
trazer e manter problemas, distorções e impasses no compartilhamento de responsabilidades.
Palavras-chave: Governança Global Migratória; Justiça Global; Pacto Global sobre Refugiados; 
Pacto Global para uma Migração Segura, Ordenada e Regular.
Resumen
Con base en los principales aportes de la teoría política normativa sobre justicia global 
y ética migratoria, este artículo evalúa los Pactos globales sobre refugiados y migración, 
aprobados por la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas en diciembre de 2018. El 
conjunto de conclusiones indica que los Pactos constituyen un importante avance en los 
proyectos y compromisos morales y políticos globales. Sin embargo, la aplicación de los 
términos previstos puede generar problemas, distorsiones y estancamientos en el reparto 
de responsabilidades.
Palabras clave: Gobernanza de la Migración Global; Justicia Global; El Pacto Mundial sobre 
Refugiados; Pacto Mundial para una Migración Segura, Ordenada y Regular.
Introduction
Historically, although there is a consolidated legal framework with regard to 
refugees, the general governance framework regarding international migration 
has always been one of little consensus, cooperation, and commitments by the 
international community. The divergent concerns between countries of origin, 
transit, and destination led to unilateral, bilateral or regional treatment of the 
issue, constituting fragmented management without a multilateral institutional 
framework defined through the UN. In the recent situation of mass migration 
and the global migratory crises of 2015 and 2016, with their repercussions 
concentrated in the developed countries of the north, many States and other 
involved actors realized there was a need to expand multilateral cooperation, 
highlighting the global dimension of the issue and the difficulty of dealing with it 
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in isolation, on a national scale. This framework accelerated the process that led 
to the formulation of the Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact 
for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, approved by the United Nations General 
Assembly in December 2018.
As a permanently dynamic phenomenon, migration, especially its international 
management, raises important normative theoretical questions arising from the 
empirical claims of the various involved actors, including origin, transit, and 
destination countries, developed or developing, as well as refugees, asylum seekers, 
and immigrants. In other words, the multiple actors involved in this phenomenon 
constantly formulate and reformulate a broad set of strategies, practices, and 
policy designs that, from the perspective of normative political theory, reflect 
fundamentals, bases, and principles, often competing and contradictory, about 
political values like freedom, equality, equity, justice, security, sovereignty, and 
democracy.
There has been a lengthy debate in the normative political theory and 
political philosophy about global justice and the ethics of migration, but even 
though part of this theoretical discussion is based on the empirical claims of 
the involved actors, the assessment of international migration regimes has been 
scarce. It is possible to raise some factors that may explain this gap. Firstly, the 
dynamics of international migration regimes have historically been marked by 
institutional weakness, informality, and a lack of global agreement through the 
UN. Secondly, global migratory management has not been dealt with directly as 
an issue of ethics and justice. And finally, divergent ethical and justice positions 
on migration have not followed the same standards of international cooperation.
With the formulation of the two Compacts under the auspices of the UN, 
albeit not binding, the international community has expanded the institutional 
frameworks for migratory governance. Against this background, the prospect of 
addressing that gap has become more viable. To this end, this article retrieves the 
main contributions of normative political theory on global justice and migration 
ethics to assess the new international agreements on migration.
The normative theoretical debate
Liberal theorists with statist and communitarian approaches tend to prioritize 
the right of nation states to control their borders and access to their citizenship, 
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and, in this sense, present restrictions on governance proposals supported in 
the defence of free international migration. This argumentation is based on 
parameters of state sovereignty, self-determination, cultural identity, democratic 
governance, and economic resources. The idea is that these parameters are 
fundamental for maintaining the political community, which must guarantee 
individual freedom and promote distributive justice (equality). In this sense, the 
loss of these parameters can mean the disintegration of the political community 
and the impossibility of a stable and well-ordered society.
Michael Walzer’s argument (1983) is not exactly to open or close borders, 
but focuses on the right for political communities to freely decide on their own 
affiliation rules, according to their own identity. Walzer (1983: 61-62) places self-
determination as the foundation of community independence, i.e. a community has 
the basic right to establish its criteria for the admission and refusal of immigrants. 
In Walzer’s (1983: 62) view of communitarianism, the political space is the same 
as the ethical and cultural space. Without self-determination, communities of 
character, historically stable, with some sense of association and common life, 
would not exist. However, for Walzer (1983: 39) the right to restrict entry does 
not imply the right to restrict exit, since emigration control implies coercion over 
people who no longer wish to be members of a particular community. Based on 
the principle of mutual aid, Walzer (1983: 47-50) recognizes the moral obligation 
to admit refugees, but this obligation is limited by the importance of maintaining 
the self-determination of communities of character. In this sense, the admission 
of refugees cannot threaten the cultural and political community, which has 
the autonomy to decide how many and which refugees to accept. In the case 
of economic migrants, Walzer (1983: 45) suggests that wealthy societies should 
promote positive assistance, providing economic aid to foreigners in their own 
countries, provided that such a measure is urgent and their risks and costs are 
relatively low.
In the wake of the self-determination argument, Christopher Heath Wellman 
(2008; 2011) resorts to the right to freedom of association to argue that legitimate 
states have the right to formulate the immigration regime they want and are 
entitled to close their borders. Wellman (2011: 13) supports this position on three 
main premises: 1) legitimate states are entitled to political self-determination; 2) 
freedom of association is an essential component of political self-determination; 
3) freedom of association does not imply an obligation to associate with outsiders. 
For Wellman (2008: 129), relational egalitarian duties require that richer states 
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promote material and military aid to the poorest, but this does not imply opening 
their borders. In the case of refugees, Wellman (2008: 129) recognizes that States 
have must offer assistance (“export of justice”), but this does not include an 
obligation to admit them, as this decision is a determination arising from the 
freedom of association, which allows for the non-association with others.
David Miller also defends immigration restrictions based on the right to 
national self-determination. In Miller’s perspective (2016), the nature of the 
relationship between compatriots is multidimensional, since it involves a system 
of economic cooperation, a shared political and legal system, and a similar set of 
cultural and belonging values. Miller (2016: 161) argues that a shared national 
culture is essential to guarantee citizens’ commitments to democracy and more 
egalitarian forms of social justice. This fact, according to him (2016: 160), has 
implications for the issue of immigration, since a huge flow of immigrants could 
overcome the capacity of the receiving country to incorporate them into the 
dominant public culture. While recognizing that national communities change 
over time, Miller (2016: 64-65) argues that a certain level of immigration can put 
an unsustainable tension on the shared public culture and threaten its integrity. 
Therefore, Miller suggests that the use of quotas to limit the flow of 
immigration is legitimate. As well as the use of social, civic and cultural integration 
mechanisms for potential permanent residents, without violating their reasonable 
preferences or offending their identities, traditions, and beliefs. Miller (2016: 204) 
rejects racial and ethnic exclusions. According to him (2016: 27), national identity 
does not mean affirming national superiority or inferiority, but rather providing 
essential solidarity in addition to economic and political relations. With regard to 
refugees, Miller (2007: 202) emphasizes that States have an obligation to admit 
them at least temporarily, guaranteeing immediate security. Nonetheless, this 
does not imply a right to the permanent residency or citizenship.
Different from the statist or communitarian assumptions presented until 
here, when the migration issue involves costs and benefits for all involved, 
some theorists allege that international migration can be harmless to alleviate 
global poverty. For Gillian Brock (2009: 193), an increase in the admission of 
immigrants by developed countries alone does not constitute a comprehensive 
solution to global justice problems, given that the latter must be accompanied 
by other measures such as fairer trade rules and other initiatives. It also suggests 
a series of global institutional reforms towards responsive democracy in the 
global system (Brock 2009: 310). In Brock’s perspective (2009), migration policies 
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should be better managed in order to benefit all parties involved. For her, there 
is evidence that immigration benefits immigrants and host countries more than 
the countries of origin. According to Brock (2009: 211), it is not clear that, even 
with remittances, immigration favours those who stay in their country of origin. 
In addition to the brain drain, the financial flows that immigrants send to their 
country of origin are not very effective in terms of justice. Remittances can have 
negative indirect effects, such as decreasing demand for fundamental economic 
reforms in developing countries and failing to resolve structural poverty issues 
(Brock 2009: 208).
Contrary to liberal statist and communitarian arguments, liberal and non-
liberal cosmopolitan theorists, global egalitarians, and global libertarians defend 
international migration management projects with more open borders. Together, 
in a deontological perspective, much of the argument around more open borders 
is based on the principles of international freedom of movement and universal 
equality (opportunities) and, in a consequentialist perspective, as a way of dealing 
with global poverty. In accordance with these views, although states have a duty 
to maintain their borders, they do not have the right to close them to immigrants, 
since this would violate the right of individuals to freedom of movement and 
equal moral consideration for all human beings. In addition, even though they 
often claim that the measure is not enough to guarantee greater global equality, 
some of these theorists believe that more open borders for immigrants can be a 
way to reduce global poverty.
Joseph Carens (1987; 1992; 2013) has developed a normative justification for 
open borders based on the value of freedom of movement for individual autonomy, 
equal opportunities, and substantive economic, social and political equality 
at the global level. For Carens (1987; 1992; 2013), the freedom of movement 
is one of the fundamental freedoms and a basic human right that contributes 
to the exercise of individual autonomy and other forms of freedom. This right 
is not restricted to the national space but constitutes freedom of international 
movement. Carens (1987: 261) reinforces his defense of international freedom of 
movement with the argument of lucky egalitarianism, which in this case means 
that immigration restrictions should not be justified based on birthplace and 
kinship, which are arbitrary and irrelevant contingencies from a moral point 
of view. In Carens’ (1992: 26) argument, equal opportunities are associated 
with the equal moral value of human beings, who should not have access to 
social positions limited by arbitrary native characteristics (such as class, race, 
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sex, or birth). In this sense, freedom of movement is a precondition for equal 
opportunities, as it enables people to seek opportunities anywhere, including 
across borders. Thus, according to Carens (2013: 226-228), by maintaining 
borders and discretionary control over immigration, democratic states violate 
their commitments to individual freedom and equality. In addition, for Carens 
(2013: 226-228), free movement can contribute to the alleviation of substantial 
global inequalities.
Aiming to reform the global refugee regime, Carens (2013: 198) treats 
resettlement as a strong and extensive moral duty of States, which must also 
find a more just way of distributing refugee resettlement. For a fairer allocation 
of refugees, Carens (2013) highlights some factors, such as: absorptive capacity 
of the receiving States; population density; economic capacity; cultural similarity, 
religion and ethnicity, and history of immigrant admission.
Kieran Oberman (2016: 36) also bases his theses on immigration in the defence 
of international freedom of movement as a human right, with no moral distinction 
between the freedom of movement within borders. While recognizing that the 
human right to migrate is not absolute and that there may be some restriction 
in situations with severe costs, Oberman (2016: 37) stresses that immigration 
restrictions are unfair, as they violate people’s basic freedoms. For Oberman 
(2017: 104), the argument for the right to migrate is related to people’s interests 
to choose freely about basic issues such as where they live, with whom they 
live, with whom they associate, which religions they practice, etc. According to 
Oberman (2017: 104), this is all recognized by international law in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.
Phillip Cole (2011) agrees with Carens and Oberman in defending more 
open borders for human rights reasons related to freedom of movement. Cole’s 
position (2011 : 178) is also supported by the idea of moral equality for all 
people, regardless of the place of birth, advocating equal access to territories. 
Immigration controls are unethical, considering that they violate the fundamental 
moral principle of equality between people. For him, a liberal universalist and 
egalitarian ethic does not end at the national frontier. Thus, for Cole (2011 : 
306), the right to cross borders can only be restricted in extreme circumstances, 
something that threatens the life of the nation, such as wars or natural disasters, 
for example. Other than that, there are no “common sense” arguments to restrict 
immigration. He proposes a global migration regime based on a liberal order of 
universal mobility in which states do not enjoy a unilateral authority to exclude 
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others. Cole (2000: 56) argues that without the right to international freedom 
of movement, which involves the right to enter, the right to leave is worthless. 
For him, the right to leave and the right to enter must be symmetrical. In this 
sense, he defends that immigration falls within the same international legal 
framework as emigration.
Finally, in this long theoretical debate, there is a set of positions that, 
in different aspects, seek to reconcile the demands of universalism and 
particularism. In general, these analyses try to find terms of reconciliation 
between the territorial rights of States, democratic sovereignty, and the rights 
of immigrants. Seyla Benhabib (2004) argues that an ideal of equality can be 
pursued with a reconciliation between redistribution and “regulated” migration, 
which does not imply a complete opening of borders and fully free movement 
of people. For Benhabib (2004: 21), migration is a complex global phenomenon 
and sovereignty is a relational concept, not a self-referential one. In this sense, 
policies related to access to citizenship should not be seen as unilateral acts of 
self-determination, but as an act of democratic negotiation that involves national 
and international constitutional norms, given that in the case of migration there 
are multilateral consequences in the world community. In this way, Benhabib 
(2004) tries to establish a moral basis for admitting foreigners to democratic states 
that balances the will for democracy with moral obligations arising from our 
global interdependence. In Benhabib’s (2004: 138-139) terms, this equalization 
would occur in guaranteeing the exercise of communicative freedom, which 
would avoid acceptance criteria based on characteristics not chosen by people, 
such as race, religion, gender, etc. Consequently, States could only deny the 
entry of foreigners for reasons that do not deny the freedom of communication, 
like qualifications, marketable skills, material resources, length of stay, language 
skills, etc. This would result, according to Benhabib (2004: 146), in a model of 
fragmented citizenship, in which foreigners receive rights, but not necessarily 
the rights of national citizens.
Also to point out difficulties in analyses focused strictly on justifications to 
restrict or allow international migration, Serena Parekh (2017) calls attention 
to the need for normative elaboration that considers the dynamics of migration 
policies, their effects, and current political conditions. Addressing the issue of 
refugees, Parekh (2017: 3) presents the fact that 65.3 million people worldwide 
are displaced from their countries of origin and have not yet found legal refuge in 
another country. Of that multitude, only 1% will be resettled in another country 
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of refuge. This means that the rest live in a situation of temporary solutions, 
such as refugee camps, where people stay on average for seventeen years. In this 
sense, for Parekh (2017), both analyses that tend to minimize and analyses that 
increase the responsibility for refugees fail to provide robust responses to certain 
situations created by the refugee regime, notably refugee camps. In Parekh’s 
(2017) argument, the concentration of political theorization in the debate on 
admission and permanent and non-temporary solutions for refugees leads to a lack 
of adequate responses to these facts. For her (2017: 18), in the current political 
conditions, camps for refugees and stateless persons have become permanent 
fixtures, because, in addition to the official solutions of repatriation, integration, 
and resettlement, there is another: containment in camps. The camps constitute 
a space distinct from common political communities, with widespread violations 
of human rights (Parekh 2017: 32). Against this background, Parekh (2017: 52) 
has developed a normative argument called “Temporary Ethics”, which stipulates 
that in refugee camps human rights and political participation for refugees must 
be guaranteed.
International Migration Governance
The phenomenon of international migration affects all regions and peoples 
on the planet, involving various social, political, economic, cultural, and security 
dimensions. According to the International Migration Report 2017 (UN 2017: 4), 
around 258 million migrants live outside their country of birth, constituting 3.4% 
of the world population. As a permanent and long-lasting phenomenon, it can 
be said that most migration processes occur through legal channels. However, in 
the last decades, with the limitations of the regimes on international migration, 
an increase of restrictive control policies in the northern countries, and the 
intensification of displacements forced by conflicts, violence, insecurity, economic 
crises, environmental changes, and others, the flow of irregular migration has 
increased. This situation has impacted States and populations of origin, transit, 
and destination, requiring international governance and cooperation mechanisms.
Historically, especially after World Wars I and II, there has been a significant 
increase in the formulation of international laws, procedures, and institutions 
related to international migration. Despite the existence of a consolidated legal 
framework concerning refugees, the general governance framework around the 
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theme has always been very fragmented, uncoordinated, ad-hoc, and imprecise 
in various spheres that involve the phenomenon. In addition, as highlighted 
by Nicholas R. Micinski and Thomas G. Weiss (2017: 179), global migration 
management has rarely resulted in binding, normative or applicable agreements. 
According to Alexander Betts (2011: 7), although the phenomenon of international 
migration has always demanded it, a coherent multilateral and formal global 
governance structure has not yet developed within the scope of the UN. On 
the contrary, the treatment of the phenomenon has remained largely under the 
control of sovereign states.
Taken together, the institutional fragility and ineffectiveness of migration 
regimes are related to the historical predominance of the approach and treatment 
of the international migratory theme on a state, national and sovereign level. Based 
on parameters of equity and global justice, it can be said that the predominance 
of the state approach, in addition to hindering multilateral, formal, and UN-
sponsored referrals, has also revealed the disparity of power between developed 
and developing countries. There has been a clear predominance of the approaches 
and interests of developed countries, which is also reflected in an unbalanced 
distribution in the sharing of the burden and responsibilities when facing different 
aspects of the migratory phenomenon.
In recent decades unprecedented levels of global migration, situations of 
increased vulnerability of migrants, and great challenges in managing the migration 
phenomenon have made it evident that international migration could no longer be 
effectively managed or controlled by national migration policies, requiring greater 
international cooperation to achieve national goals in international migration 
(Koser 2010: 302-303). In this context, albeit different perspectives on the role 
of global migration governance, mainly with regard to political and normative 
demands between countries of origin in the South and receiving countries in 
the North, from the beginning of the 2000s countries recognized the need for 
some kind of multilateral governance architecture to manage migration (Betts 
and Kainz 2017: 4). This fact can be evidenced in the actions of the UN, which 
placed the issue as one of its central topics of discussion, mainly due to the 
efforts of Kofi Annan as Secretary-General of the UN (1997-2006). The creation 
of the Global Commission on International Migration (CGMI) in 2003, with the 
prospect of greater UN involvement in addressing the various dimensions of the 
international migration phenomenon, can be considered a milestone in the UN’s 
attempt at greater participation in global management of international migration.
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Following this fact, in 2006, in response to a recommendation from the Global 
Commission on International Migration, the UN Secretary-General established 
the Global Migration Group. It is a high-level inter-agency group involved in 
migration-related activities, with the role of promoting the broader application 
of all relevant international and regional instruments and standards related to 
migration, encouraging the adoption of more coherent, comprehensive, and 
better-coordinated approaches. Two events that should also be noted in this 
process of greater UN involvement in migration governance were the High-Level 
Dialogues on Migration and Development held in 2006 and 2013. Although they 
had a limited deliberative format and produced little expressive results, the two 
Dialogues were important steps in attempting to deal with the international 
migration phenomenon on an integrated, global, and non-fragmented basis.
In the wake of these events, in July 2016, the UN General Assembly 
unanimously adopted a resolution that approved the agreement to incorporate the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) into the UN (UN 2016a). Initially 
created to resettle refugees from Europe, the IOM has long been an important player 
in the field of human mobility, acting for the protection of migrants and displaced 
persons, and in the resettlement of refugees and voluntary returns. However, 
many scholars have noted that over time, the IOM has had a controversial and 
ambivalent performance, oscillating between cooperation and non-cooperation 
with UN agencies, depending on the political interests in question (Pécoud 2018). 
By linking the IOM to the UN, the UN General Assembly took an important step 
in aligning the IOM with multilateral demands and the multiple actors involved.
This scenario of broadening the discussion on global migratory governance 
was accelerated by an increase in the movement of large numbers of refugees and 
migrants, mainly the refugee crisis in Europe 2015 and 2016. This fact also made 
it more evident that the discussion on migration management has ceased to be 
a political issue for the exclusive treatment of national states. The emergence of 
demands from civil society to be included in discussions about the topic and the 
involvement of all stakeholders has given governance dynamics multiple levels, 
as well as formal and informal spheres. For Marion Panizzon and Micheline Van 
Riemsdijk (2019 : 1225), the large flows of migrants and the refugee crisis have 
changed the capacities of States to govern international migration. According to 
Marion Panizzon and Micheline Van Riemsdijk (2019 : 1225), actors from civil 
society, regions, and cities working in crisis management have assumed roles 
traditionally played by national governments and international organizations. 
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Even if the degrees of interaction between the proposals formulated at these 
scales and levels remain fragmented, and considering that the participation 
by multiple actors is subject to hierarchies, it is already possible to verify an 
emerging framework of a multilevel global migratory governance.
Together, the processes described above culminated in the New York Declaration. 
Unanimously adopted by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution on 
September 19, 2016, the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants laid the 
groundwork and commitments for two intergovernmental consultation processes 
for negotiations about the Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact 
for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. An important fact highlighted by the 
Declaration was the call for the formulation of the two agreements “through an 
open, transparent and inclusive process of consultations and negotiations, and 
the effective participation of all interested parties”. (UN 2016b).
The New York Declaration outlined three phases for the drafting of Global 
Compacts. First, a consultation phase, carried out between April and December 2017, 
involving contributions and recommendations not only from different government 
actors but also from civil society stakeholders and affected communities, who 
participated in five thematic discussions in Geneva. For Stefan Rother and Elias 
Steinhilper (2019: 244), an established framework for “migration governance 
from below” has allowed civil society and migrant organizations, in particular, to 
significantly impact the process and outcome of the Global Compact for Orderly 
and Regular Migration while, in the case of the Global Compact on Refugees, 
international refugee networks used the negotiation process to be recognized as 
actors in the international system.
Next, a survey phase took place where the information collected during the 
consultations was processed. This resulted in a “Zero Draft” prepared by Mexico 
and Switzerland, co-facilitators of the process. Between February and July 2018 
intergovernmental negotiations were conducted, which resulted in the texts of 
the two Compacts. In December 2018, at the UN Conference in Morocco, the vast 
majority of the General Assembly approved the “Global Compact on Refugees” 
and the “Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration”.
The Global Compact on Refugees
The Global Compact on Refugees is based on the 1951 Convention on the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, centred on the fundamental principle 
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of non-refoulement and governed by international human rights instruments, 
international humanitarian law, and other international instruments on the 
subject (UNHCR 2018a: paragraph 5). The Compact establishes four objectives: 
1) relieve pressure on host countries; 2) increase refugee self-sufficiency; 
3) expand access to third-country solutions; 4) and helping to create conditions 
in countries of origin for citizens to return in security and dignity (paragraph 7). 
The Compact seeks to address the root causes of refugee movements to facilitate 
access to long-term solutions. To this end, recognizes voluntary repatriation under 
safe and dignified conditions as the preferred solution in most refugee situations 
(paragraph 87). The Compact’s preferred long-term solution is not new, since 
voluntary repatriation is already the predominant practice of the international 
refugee regime. In the normative theoretical terms presented in this case, it can 
be said that the justifications of the statist-communitarian (Walzer 1983; Wellman 
2008; Miller 2016) basis for the admission of refugees remain in the Compact, such 
as the sovereignty of States to decide on the entry of refugees into their territories, 
the cultural integrity of receiving countries, limited economic resources for receiving 
a large contingent of refugees and defending refugees’ human rights in their 
communities of origin. In fact, voluntary repatriation in a safe and dignified way 
remains the ideal solution. It turns out that, in recent decades, mass repatriation 
movements have been carried out under very adverse conditions for refugees. 
Developing countries often lack the resources to sustain a large refugee population 
for a long time in their territories. Developed countries, on the other hand, may 
provide insufficient funding for long-term assistance programs. Furthermore, 
countries of origin might support repatriation measures as a way of demonstrating 
internal stability to the international community, even if this situation does not 
exist. All these factors have contributed to situations of extreme vulnerability of 
refugees, a problem the Compact seeks to address. Success, however, will depend 
on significantly improving the above-mentioned issues.
Paragraph 3 establishes a bold commitment to providing a basis for a 
predictable and equitable sharing of responsibilities among all Member States 
of the UN. In this perspective, the Compact provides for the periodic convening 
of the World Forum on Global Refugees, so that all Member States and interested 
parties can announce pledges to contribute to concrete measures aimed at achieving 
the objectives and improving the distribution of burdens and responsibilities; 
assess progress in achieving the objectives; and exchange good practices and 
experiences (paragraphs 17; 103). The Compact is not legally binding (paragraph 
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4). In this sense, contributions will be voluntary, determined by each State and 
each stakeholder, considering the realities, capacities, and levels of development 
of each country and respecting its national policies and priorities (paragraph 4). 
The articulation of a more equitable, predictable and sustainable distribution of 
burdens and responsibilities will be under the coordination of UNHCR, States, 
and stakeholders (paragraph 48). The use of indicators by the international 
community to assess the achievement of objectives in the planned World Refugee 
Forums is the tool for examining the mechanisms for the distribution of burdens 
and responsibilities (paragraphs 102; 103; 104).
Seen from a perspective of global justice and migration ethics, it can be said 
that the Compact addresses one of the most important issues of the international 
refugee regime, which is the sharing of burdens and responsibilities, a field notably 
marked by tensions, inequalities, and little commitment of States. Although there is 
an institutionalized normativity around asylum, with States recognizing they have 
certain obligations towards refugees present in their territory, the same is not true 
concerning refugees outside their territory. Since the origin of the international refugee 
regime, States have been reluctant to make mandatory and continuous financial 
and resettlement commitments to refugee crises distant from their territories. In 
general, the sharing of responsibilities is uneven, with most of the burden assumed 
by States in the vicinity of where refugee generating crises occur.
As a rule, supported by the rules governing the international refugee regime, 
developed countries grant asylum to refugees who are in their territories and cannot 
return to their countries of origin for security reasons. However, by complying 
with the principle of non-refoulement, these countries work with the prospect of 
preventing potential refugees from reaching their territories, which would imply 
granting asylum (Gibney 2005; Parekh 2017). According to Matthew Gibney 
(2005: 4), to avoid the commitment of non-refoulement, developed countries 
apply “non-arrival measures”, such as the use of visa regimes, carrier sanctions, 
immigration pre-inspection, and interdiction at sea. Such strategies and deterrence 
practices in migration management have generated informal or institutionalized 
“transit spaces”, which include transit points and temporary or semi-permanent 
residences for the containment and retreat of people who seek refuge (De Vries 
& Guild 2019). By characterizing the reality of these spaces as a combination of 
fractured mobility, daily violence, and fundamental uncertainty, Leonie Ansems de 
Vries and Elspeth Guild (2019: 2157) have recovered the term “exhaustion policy”; 
a deliberate strategy of mobility governance aimed at demotivating people from 
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attempting to cross borders. Such migration governance practices in developed 
countries demonstrate the low level of commitment of these countries to refugees 
outside their territory.
According to the Global Trends Forced Displacement study of 2018 (UNHCR 
2019: 13) the refugee population under UNHCR’s mandate at that point stood at 
20.4 million, having almost doubled since 2012 when it was 10.5 million, with 
two thirds from just five countries (Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar, 
and Somalia). According to the study, the total global refugee population is at 
the highest level ever recorded — 25.9 million at the end of 2018, including 5.5 
million Palestinian refugees under UNRWA’s mandate. As has been the case since 
2014, the main country of origin of refugees in 2018 was Syria, with 6.7 million. 
These refugees were received by 127 countries on six continents, but the vast 
majority (85%) remained in countries in the region (UNHCR 2019: 14). Turkey 
continued to host the largest population of Syrian refugees, with 3.7 million at 
the end of the year. More than 98% of the refugees in Turkey were from Syria, 
totalling 3.6 million (UNHCR 2019: 14). These data show that the majority of 
refugees flee to a neighbouring country.
As can be seen, there is an imbalance in the sharing of burdens and 
responsibilities, since the countries closest to the situations of conflict and violence 
receive the bulk of the refugees. Note that these countries are low and middle 
income, belonging to the Global South. According to the report Global Trends 
Forced Displacement in 2017 (UNHCR 2018b: 15), low and middle-income countries 
are home to around 85% of the world’s refugees. Although the largest UNHCR 
financiers are developed countries, with emphasis on the USA, the European Union, 
and Germany, respectively, in 2018, the UNHCR budget fell short, presenting a 
deficit of 43% (UNCHR 2018c: 10). Therefore, there is a need for more countries 
to release resources. In high-income countries, there are on average only 2.7 
refugees per thousand inhabitants, but that number is more than double in middle 
and low-income countries, with 5.8 refugees per thousand (UNHCR 2019: 21). 
There is also a need for a better distribution of resettlement among countries, 
especially those with higher incomes. The Compact does not establish State 
quotas for refugee resettlement, mainly from the north, as humanitarian groups 
and associations wanted. Nor does it establish a mandatory resettlement duty, 
according to the principle of humanitarianism argued in theories like those of 
Carens (2013) and Benhabib (2004). In this respect, in normative theoretical terms, 
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it can be said that the right of self-determination of the statist-communitarian 
approaches prevails.
Additionally, there is the issue of long-term refugees. Paragraph 14 of the 
Compact recognizes that countries that receive and accommodate refugees for long 
periods must obtain support from the international community, as they make an 
immense contribution to humanity. According to UNHCR (UNHCR 2019: 22), in 
2018 78% of all refugees were in prolonged situations, equivalent to 15.9 million 
refugees. UNHCR defines a protracted refugee situation as one in which 25,000 
or more refugees of the same nationality have been in exile for five consecutive 
years or more in a given host country. In fact, the protracted refugee situation in 
camps is the main picture of the refugee phenomenon in our time. With no return 
conditions, no resettlement or integration in other countries, refugees remain in 
the camps. As Parekh (2017: 3) pointed out, the average stay in refugee camps is 
seventeen years. There is no obligation in the Compact for temporary admission 
or the expansion of political rights for refugees in long-term camps.
As pointed out, the Compact establishes mechanisms for solidarity, cooperation, 
and sharing responsibilities. However, as it is not legally binding, the Compact does 
not create mandatory normative commitments for financing, resettlement, and 
sharing responsibilities. In this sense, the predictable and equitable burden and 
the sharing of responsibilities can be compromised. The suggested mechanisms 
will depend on voluntary contributions and consider the absorption capacity, 
the level of development, and the demographic situation of different countries. 
UNHCR’s track record in ensuring responsibility-sharing is not very encouraging. 
In general, commitments are not long-lasting and are more present in critical 
situations. The nationalist, identitarian, and anti-immigration sentiments present 
in some countries do not help, nor does the reduction of resettlement programs, 
which are already small given the number of refugees. In societies with a high 
degree of polarization around the issue, it is difficult for States to make lasting 
commitments and obligations to provide financial support and receive refugees. 
The voluntary character, subject to national priorities, may reinforce this, and 
contributions can fluctuate as needed.
The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration
The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration was, above all, 
the adoption of the first comprehensive framework of principles and objectives to 
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supply international migration governance with a single framework. In addition, 
although always emphasizing state sovereignty, it recognizes the challenges of 
coordinating, operating, monitoring, and financing a system of multilateral and 
multilevel global governance. According to paragraph 1, the Compact is based 
on the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter (UN 2018). Its 
format comprises 4 parts: “Vision and Guiding Principles”; 23 “Objectives” with 
respective “Commitments”; “Implementation”; and “Follow-up and Review” 
mechanisms. Its application provides for local, regional, and global cooperation 
under the UN system, and in association with migrants and civil society 
(paragraphs 40; 43; 44; 45).
Adopted with a greater number of abstentions and votes against than the 
Refugee Compact, the Global Compact on Migration reiterated the distinction 
between refugees and migrants, who have the same universal human rights 
and fundamental freedoms that must be respected, protected, and fulfilled, but 
which constitute separate groups that are governed by separate legal frameworks 
(paragraph 4). In this case, the concern of many States, mainly from the developed 
north, has prevailed in preventing economic migrants from being governed by the 
same legal frameworks as refugees. On the issue of human rights, the Compact 
adopts the principle of non-regression (paragraph 15f), which means that once 
a human right is recognized, it cannot be removed or restricted. Note that the 
Compact does not establish the right to migration as a human right, nor does 
it create new human rights, as advocated by cosmopolitan normative theories.
Recognized as a harmful problem for all agents involved in the migratory 
process, irregular migration highlights one of the central mismatches between 
migration regimes and migratory social dynamics. In Objective 5, paragraph 21, 
States commit to improving the availability and flexibility of routes for regular 
migration. It is not a matter of regularizing all migrants in an irregular situation, 
nor of creating an international standard that provides for State obligations or 
individual rights to regularization. But, as provided for in objective 7, item (i), 
ensures an individual assessment that allows individuals to regularize their 
situation, per case with clear and transparent criteria. Non-state stakeholders 
demanded commitments to regularize irregular long-term migrants, but there was 
no agreement between States on this issue. In objective 5, item (i), the Compact 
provides for facilitating access to family reunification procedures for migrants, 
at all skill levels. Family reunification has always been a demand from countries 
in the Global South and civil society actors. The expression “at all skill levels” is 
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in line with the demands of scholars and human rights groups that often point 
to a selective procedure in the policies of developed countries, which offer the 
possibility of family reunification to highly qualified workers whilst denying it 
for less qualified workers.
The adoption of more inclusive, cooperative, and comprehensive perspectives 
can be a way to mitigate the problem. Nevertheless, putting these perspectives 
into practice is not easy. On the one hand, it is not possible to reach a situation 
where all people can satisfy their basic needs for life in their place of birth in the 
near future. On the other hand, despite the efforts of some political and societal 
leaders to establish and enforce the Compact, the current global political scenario 
has experienced an increase in protectionism, isolationism, and xenophobic 
nationalism, all of which have reduced the willingness of governments and 
societies to assume and share the responsibilities for migration.
With regard to labour migration, historically, the prevalence of global 
governance based on the domestic policies of sovereign states has created a situation 
in which northern destination countries have adopted selective immigration 
policies, facilitating the entry of highly skilled workers and wealthy individuals, 
whilst tightly controlling the entry of low-skilled workers. Such facts represent 
an unequal cost distribution among States, with poorer countries bearing the 
cost of losing qualified labour. Objective two aims to minimize the adverse and 
structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin. In item 
(e) of this objective, the Compact deals with brain drain and investment in the 
development of human capital, and the creation of productive jobs in cooperation 
with the private sector and unions to reduce youth unemployment. In this way, 
a contribution can be made to alleviate the brain drain in poorer countries 
and take advantage of the demographic dividend. The emphasis here is on the 
realization of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (objective 2, item 
a), which would eliminate the adverse factors and structural factors that compel 
people to leave their country of origin. In the theoretical debate presented here, 
the diagnosis of the Compact seems to follow the line of authors like Gillian 
Brock (2015), who pointed to evidence that the “brain drain” presents losses to 
the poor countries of origin.
Another controversial issue in terms of global justice and migration ethics 
is related to the remittances that immigrants send to their countries of origin. 
In the Compact, some objectives address the demands of countries of origin, 
such as Objective 20, which provides for the promotion of faster, safer, and more 
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economical remittance transfers and fosters the financial inclusion of migrants, 
recognizing the transformative effect that remittances have on the well-being of 
migrant workers and their families, as well as on the sustainable development 
of countries. In paragraph 36, the Compact stresses that remittances are an 
important source of private capital and cannot be equated with other currents 
of international financing like foreign direct investment, official development 
assistance and other public sources of financing for development. Accordingly, 
according to the Compact, in line with the proposals of developing countries, 
remittances cannot replace other forms of development assistance. There is no 
recognition in the Compact that remittances are an inadvertent cause of irregular 
migration and family separation. According to a report by the World Bank and 
KNOMAD (2018: 4), migrants worldwide sent US $ 613 billion in remittances in 
2017. This number is much higher than all international assistance for development 
abroad in 2017, which according to OECD (2018: 267) data totalled $ 146.6 billion.
The involuntary return of migrants has always been a subject of disagreements 
and controversies between countries of origin in the South and destination 
countries in the North. The latter often claim that there is little effort from 
countries of origin to guarantee return migration. In turn, countries of origin 
argue that human rights and the dignity of migrants are often violated in return 
actions. Additionally, they complain about the difficulties of reintegration in 
poor countries and a lack of assistance and international financial aid for this 
reintegration. In this matter, both sides make commitments, as is the case of 
Objective 21, paragraph 37, which provides for collaboration to facilitate the 
return and readmission in safe and dignified conditions, as well as sustainable 
reintegration in the country of origin to ensure that their nationals are properly 
received and readmitted. Note that Objective 21, paragraph 37, also endorses 
fundamental principles of protection, providing for the prohibition of collective 
expulsion and the return of migrants when there is a real and foreseeable risk 
of death, torture, and other cruel, inhuman treatment such as punishment or 
humiliation, or other irreparable damage. Thus, while recognizing that States 
have a sovereign right to return migrants who are not authorized to stay in their 
territories, the Compact establishes a dignified return, due process of law, and 
a ban on collective expulsions or returns in situations where there is a serious 
risk of damage or death.
The Compact presents itself as a framework of non-legally binding cooperation, 
whose purpose is to foster international, regional, and bilateral cooperation 
Normative Political Theory and Global Migration Governance [...]
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 3, e1176, 2021  
20-23
and dialogue on migration, recognizing that no State can approach migration in 
isolation, and respecting the sovereignty of States and their obligations under 
international law (paragraphs 7; 15b). In paragraph 15c, the Compact reaffirms the 
sovereign right of States to determine their migration policy and the prerogative 
to regulate migration within their jurisdiction in accordance with international 
law, being able to distinguish between regular and irregular migration status. 
Even though it did not impose new obligations on the signatory countries, the 
Compact was rejected by some countries on the grounds that its adoption implies 
an infringement on their sovereignty. Evidently, taking into account the different 
positions of the negotiating governments, the Compact has simultaneously adopted 
both the principles of international cooperation and national sovereignty. The 
great challenge lies in the coordination and integration of these principles that 
may collide. In certain cases, the exercise of national sovereignty can preclude 
international cooperation.
Conclusion
After a long history of fragmentation in global migration management, 
despite not being binding, the two multilateral global Compacts within the UN 
system constitute a significant advance in global moral and political projects 
and commitments. Notably marked by a predominance of sovereign national 
policies in developed countries and by informal processes, which have always 
hampered more equitable terms of cooperation and responsibility between States 
and other actors involved, international migration regimes have demonstrated 
their inefficiencies in the face of the challenges presented in recent decades. 
This has made it possible to expand the treatment of migratory governance in 
multilateral and multilevel terms, under the coordination of the UN. It does not 
mean, however, that this process and consequently the Compacts, are free of 
contradictions, objections, and non-adhesions.
Altogether, from a normative theoretical perspective on global justice and 
migration ethics, it can be said that the Compacts are based on positions more in 
tune with statist-communitarian positions on sovereignty and self-determination, 
which provide for a conditioned admission of refugees and restrictions on economic 
migration. The emphasis is on development aid to ensure the self-sufficiency of 
countries of origin, thus preventing the departure of their inhabitants and resulting 
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in “brain drain”. Furthermore, in cases where a considerable outflow does occur, the 
emphasis is on promoting and facilitating safe return and repatriation. In relation 
to the integration of immigrants, besides rejecting all forms of discrimination, 
the goal is social, civic, and cultural integration in the destination countries. As 
a deal between countries with different positions and powers in the international 
system, an agreement was reached because the coordination, accountability, 
monitoring, and financing of the terms and objectives of the Compacts are not 
binding, even though they do contain mechanisms for assessment and review. 
Seen in this way, the Compacts are an expression of the views and standards of 
international migration governance generally upheld by more developed transit 
and destination countries.
For this reason, operationalization of the terms provided for in the Compacts 
can bring about problems, distortions, and impasses in the sharing responsibilities, 
despite the focus on multilateral, multilevel perspectives of solidarity and 
cooperation, and considering the specific interests of countries of origin, transit 
and destination. In the case of refugees, the unfair distribution of responsibilities 
between developed and developing countries is likely to remain, as well as the 
prevalence of non-entry and selective immigration policies in developed countries.
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